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Reconciling Rights: The Whatcott 
Case as Missed Opportunity 
Cara Faith Zwibel* 
“We often miss opportunity because it’s  
dressed in overalls and looks like work.” 
— Thomas A. Edison  
I. A MISSED OPPORTUNITY 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s recent consideration of the hate 
speech provisions1 in the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code2 was an 
opportunity to grapple with several fundamental rights and freedoms that 
frequently come into conflict. The case — Saskatchewan (Human Rights 
Commission) v. Whatcott3 — grew out of what some might consider minor 
incidents of flyer distribution in some Saskatchewan neighbourhoods. 
Like most cases considered by the Court, however, it has implications 
that extend well beyond the interests of the parties to the appeal and may 
have ripple effects in a number of different areas.  
                                                                                                             
* Cara Faith Zwibel is Director of the Fundamental Freedoms Program at the Canadian 
Civil Liberties Association. The views represented in this article are my own. I am grateful to 
Marc Gibson, articling student-at-law, for his research assistance and his help in commenting on an 
earlier draft of this paper.  
1 While I will refer to the relevant provisions of human rights statutes as “hate speech 
provisions” throughout this paper, they should be distinguished from the Criminal Code’s 
prohibition on the wilful promotion of hatred, as set out in s. 319(2): R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. While the 
definition of hatred and the standard the courts use to assess expression against this definition is the 
same, there are significant differences. For example, no proceeding under s. 319(2) of the Criminal 
Code may be commenced without the consent of the Attorney General; see also Criminal Code, 
s. 319(6). In addition, there is a mens rea or intent requirement associated with the Criminal Code 
section, and defences are available. The human rights provisions do not have an intent requirement, 
are driven by individual complaints, and there are no defences since the focus is on the impact of the 
expression, rather than its purpose or intended consequences. In addition, the Criminal Code and 
human rights provisions allow for different types of penalties/remedies.  
2 S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1 [hereinafter “Saskatchewan Human Rights Code”]. 
3 [2013] S.C.J. No. 11, 276 C.R.R. (2d) 270 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Whatcott”]. 
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The Whatcott case created an opportunity to examine the foundations 
of freedom of expression, as well as what constitutional protection of the 
right means for Canadian society. At the same time, Whatcott provided 
the Court with a chance to look at our ongoing struggle to achieve equal-
ity and eradicate discrimination, and at the tools that some Canadian 
jurisdictions have chosen to accomplish these goals. Finally, the case al-
lowed the Court to examine one of its own important precedents and 
consider whether reasoning that was rooted in a different time could be 
maintained in light of the evolution of the law and social realities. Put 
briefly, Whatcott was about much more than whether a single individual, 
with strongly held religious objections to homosexual behaviour, could 
distribute literature to some Saskatchewan homes.  
In this article, I argue that Whatcott represents a missed opportunity 
to delve into the difficult process of reconciling competing rights and 
freedoms and address the efficacy of the hate speech provisions. While I 
critique both the outcome of the case and the Court’s reasoning, it is the 
latter that will be the focus of this discussion. Regardless of one’s view 
on the constitutionality or effectiveness of hate speech provisions, the 
Court’s reasons for decision simply fail to adequately address the impor-
tant issues the case raises. This failure led the Court to ignore both 
Canada’s historical and practical experience with hate speech provisions 
in human rights statutes, and the future implications of the decision to 
continue down this path. 
I will begin by placing Whatcott in historical context and reviewing 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s first consideration of a hate speech pro-
vision in human rights legislation: Canada (Human Rights Commission) 
v. Taylor.4 I will then briefly survey some of the jurisprudence coming 
from Canadian jurisdictions with similar provisions and review a few of 
the changes that have occurred by way of legislative amendment and ju-
dicial consideration. I will also briefly touch on the thoughtful review of 
the federal hate speech provision undertaken by Richard Moon in 2008, 
at the request of the Canadian Human Rights Commission (“CHRC”) 
and some of the debates and controversy that led to that review.  
The bulk of this article will be dedicated to analyzing the Whatcott 
decision itself. I will argue that the Court failed to give adequate 
consideration to whether hate speech provisions in human rights codes 
are well suited to achieving the goals or objectives they are designed to 
                                                                                                             
4 [1990] S.C.J. No. 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Taylor”]. 
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achieve and that, in so doing, the Court missed an opportunity to address 
some core issues. First, the Court avoided addressing the subjectivity 
concern that has been at the heart of most critiques of hate speech laws. 
Careful consideration of the experience with human rights provisions and 
with its own decision in Taylor over the last two decades would have 
illustrated the impact that the necessarily vague and subjective 
understanding of hatred has had on the robust protection of freedom of 
expression. Second, the Court missed an opportunity to elaborate on the 
kinds of harms that hate speech laws are designed to prevent and closely 
consider how effectively these laws operate in practice. The courts have 
given hatred a narrow construction in order to safeguard freedom of 
expression, but in so doing they have failed to examine how effective 
such a definition is in achieving the legislature’s goal — namely, 
preventing discrimination. While the use of inflammatory and hateful 
language may be easier for a court to identify as hate speech, these forms 
of expression may also be less likely to incite hatred than subtler, but 
perhaps more insidious, messages. I will argue that, at best, the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s reasoning on these issues is incomplete and 
convoluted, and that the Court missed a rare opportunity to examine how 
to reconcile freedom of expression, freedom of religion and equality 
when they come into conflict. I conclude by positing that the outcome in 
Whatcott (including Mr. Whatcott’s behaviour following the decision), 
highlights the limits of what the law can achieve when it comes to 
difficult social problems like racism, homophobia and discrimination 
more broadly.  
II. HUMAN RIGHTS CODES AND HATE SPEECH: SOME HISTORY 
Although every Canadian jurisdiction has enacted a human rights 
code to address discrimination in a variety of forums, not all have opted 
to address hateful expression. Such provisions are found in the human 
rights codes of Saskatchewan,5 Alberta,6 British Columbia7 and the 
Northwest Territories,8 as well as in the federal Canadian Human Rights 
Act.9 While there are minor variations in the wording of some of the 
                                                                                                             
5 Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, supra, note 2, s. 14(1)(b). 
6 Alberta Human Rights Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-25.5, s. 3(1)(b).  
7 Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, s. 7(1)(b). 
8 Human Rights Act, S.N.W.T. 2002, c. 18, s. 13(1)(c). 
9 Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. 13 [hereinafter “CHRA” or the “Act”].  
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provisions, each is directed at forms of expression that expose or are 
likely to expose a person or group of persons to hatred or contempt on 
the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination. 
1. The Taylor Standard 
The Supreme Court first considered the federal hate speech provision 
in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor.10 The Taylor decision 
was rendered on the same day as R. v. Keegstra,11 which addressed the 
constitutionality of the Criminal Code prohibition on hate speech. In 
both cases, a seven-judge panel of the Court split 4-3 in upholding the 
constitutionality of the provisions.  
The Taylor case concerned the distribution of cards that invited 
recipients to call a telephone number. The number was answered by 
recorded messages that, according to the Court, denigrated the Jewish race 
and religion.12 Taylor argued that section 13(1) of the CHRA13 violated 
section 2(b), the Charter’s14 guarantee of freedom of expression, in a 
manner that could not be reasonably justified in a free and democratic 
society. The Taylor Court was unanimous in finding that the prohibition 
in section 13(1) of the CHRA violated section 2(b), and rejected the 
notion that the offensive content of messages could be sufficient reason 
to deny protection under section 2(b). Both the majority and dissent were 
also convinced that Parliament’s objective of promoting equality and 
prohibiting discriminatory practices were pressing and substantial goals. 
                                                                                                             
10 Taylor, supra, note 4. 
11 [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.). 
12 The complaints against Mr. Taylor and the Western Guard Party were initially brought to 
the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (“CHRT”) in 1979, prior to the enactment of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, infra, note 14. The Tribunal found a contravention of s. 13(1) of 
the CHRA and made a cease and desist order that was filed with the Federal Court and could be 
enforced as a court order. Taylor and his party continued to engage in the practices and eventually 
Taylor had to serve a year in prison for contempt, while the Party was responsible for paying a 
$5,000 fine. Even after serving time in jail, Mr. Taylor and the Party resumed the telephone service. 
When the CHRC once again sought to enforce the Tribunal’s Order, the Charter had come into effect.  
13 Section 13(1) states:  
It is a discriminatory practice for a person or a group of persons acting in concert to 
communicate telephonically or to cause to be so communicated, repeatedly, in whole or 
in part by means of the facilities of a telecommunication undertaking within the legisla-
tive authority of Parliament, any matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to 
hatred or contempt by reason of the fact that that person or those persons are identifiable 
on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination. 
14 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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The judges parted ways, however, in assessing the proportionality of 
section 13(1) in light of these goals. Chief Justice Dickson, writing for the 
majority, held that the phrase “hatred and contempt” could be interpreted 
in a way that was sufficiently precise and narrow to be proportional to the 
legislative objective. To make this finding, Dickson C.J.C. confined the 
definition of “hatred and contempt” to “unusually strong and deep-felt 
emotions of detestation, calumny and vilification”.15  
On the other hand, McLachlin J. (as she then was), writing for the 
dissent, found the “broad and vague ambit”16 of the provision troubling 
and ultimately fatal to the section’s constitutionality. Justice McLachlin 
held that the provision was not rationally connected to its objective 
because it went further than necessary to achieve it. In contrast to the 
majority, she found that the breadth of the provision made it difficult to 
determine where mere dislike ends and hatred begins. In her words 
“[T]he phrase does not assist in sending a clear and precise indication to 
members of society as to what the limits of impugned speech are.”17 
While McLachlin J. characterized the process envisaged by the Act as 
“exemplary”18 in terms of its balancing of freedom of expression and 
discrimination interests, she nevertheless concluded that it effectively 
delegated the power to infringe the Charter and that the chilling effect of 
the section’s breadth could not be ignored. Justice McLachlin also noted 
the absence of any defences to violations of section 13(1) under the Act. 
She acknowledged that this was consistent with the legislation’s remedial 
focus, but concluded that this factor also served to broaden the section’s 
application and further contributed to its failure to meet the rational 
connection test under section 1 of the Charter.19 In balancing the 
importance of freedom of expression as against the benefit sought to be 
gained (i.e., the elimination or reduction of discrimination), McLachlin J. 
characterized the infringement as “most serious” since it touched on 
“expression which may be relevant to social and political issues”.20 
Significantly, she also questioned some of the concerns raised about the 
damage caused by hate speech, noting that the ability of the prohibition 
to deal effectively with discrimination was not clear-cut. As a result, 
                                                                                                             
15 Taylor, supra, note 4, at 928. 
16 Id., at 959.  
17 Id., at 962. 
18 Id., at 964.  
19 As laid out in R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Oakes”].  
20 Taylor, supra, note 4, at 968.  
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McLachlin J. concluded that the benefits of the provision were not worth 
its substantial costs.  
The dissent in the Taylor case puts forth both classic freedom of 
speech arguments with a more targeted look at the mechanism chosen by 
Parliament in the CHRA and how it could, and did, operate. At the heart 
of the dissent is a concern about the breadth of the prohibition, its 
subjective nature, and its ability to address the harm at which it is aimed. 
In my view, these are the same issues that needed to be addressed in the 
Whatcott case, particularly in light of the experience with hate speech 
provisions in the more than 20 years since Taylor.  
2. Developments Post-Taylor 
Even though the tribunals tasked with interpreting and applying hate 
speech provisions have, in general, made use of the Taylor definition, 
they have also recognized the need for more specific tools to help weed 
out speech that is simply offensive and ensure that they only capture the 
extreme and unusual species of expression known as “hatred”. Attempts 
have been made by tribunals and courts to particularize the meaning of 
this term and render it more concrete. Thus, in Warman v. Kouba21 a 
member of the CHRT reviewed the jurisprudence under the Act’s hate 
speech provision and developed a number of “hallmarks of hatred” to 
help differentiate hate speech from other offensive commentary. These 
hallmarks include:  
(1) portraying the targeted group as a “powerful menace”;  
(2) the use of true stories to make negative generalizations about the 
group; 
(3) portraying the group as preying on children, the aged or other vul-
nerable persons;  
(4) blaming the group for current problems;  
(5) portraying them as violent or dangerous by nature;  
(6) conveying the idea that the members of the group have no redeem-
ing qualities and are simply evil;  
                                                                                                             
21 [2006] C.H.R.D. No. 50, 2006 CHRT 50 (Can. H.R.T.) [hereinafter “Kouba”]. 
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(7) communicating the idea that the banishment, segregation or eradica-
tion of the group is necessary to save others from harm;  
(8) dehumanizing the group by comparisons to animals, vermin, excre-
ment and other noxious substances;  
(9) using highly inflammatory and derogatory language to create a tone 
of extreme hatred and contempt; 
(10) trivializing or celebrating past persecution or tragedy involving 
group members; and 
(11) calling for violent action against the group.22  
It is not necessary to have all of these hallmarks of hatred in order to 
run afoul of the law, and the list is not intended to be exhaustive, but it 
did prove useful for tribunal members struggling with the inherent sub-
jectivity of hatred. The list also helps to demonstrate the truly extreme 
nature of the expression that these provisions aim to capture.  
Hate speech cases can make a big splash in the media and are fre-
quently the subject of controversy, but they actually represent a very 
small proportion of what human rights tribunals do. Between 2001 and 
2008, the hate speech complaints made to the federal Commission repre-
sented about 2 per cent of the total complaints received.23 Of this 2 per 
cent (representing 73 complaints), only 16 were actually adjudicated by 
the Tribunal and in each one the Tribunal determined that there had been 
a violation of section 13.24 Figures showing the proportion of hate speech 
complaints that were referred to a provincial tribunal are not easily ac-
cessible, but it suffices to say that hate speech cases are not at all 
representative of the work typically done by human rights tribunals. 
Moreover, at least at the federal level, a large number of the cases that 
ultimately resulted in hearings before the Canadian Human Rights Tribu-
nal were brought by a single individual complainant. The individual, 
Richard Warman, is a former investigator for the Canadian Human 
Rights Commission, although he initiated most of his complaints after he 
                                                                                                             
22 Id., at paras. 24-77. 
23 These figures are taken from Richard Moon, Report to the Canadian Human Rights 
Commission Concerning Section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Regulation of Hate 
Speech on the Internet (Ottawa: Canadian Human Rights Commission, 2008), at 12 [hereinafter 
“Moon Report”]. The Moon Report is discussed further below. 
24 Id. At the time that the Moon Report was published, 34 of the 73 complaints were sent to 
the CHRT and 10 were resolved before adjudication; eight of the complaints that were sent to the 
CHRT were awaiting conciliation or adjudication.  
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left that position. Mr. Warman sought out hateful expression on the Inter-
net and participated in online discussion forums on these sites to assess 
how to best proceed with a complaint. The cases he initiated are not rep-
resentative of what Parliament likely had in mind when the provision 
was enacted and there is little evidence that vulnerable groups have seen 
section 13 as a vital tool in their struggle for equality.  
Despite the small number of cases that have been the subject of 
adjudication, there has been some heated debate and discussion in the 
academic literature and the mainstream media about the role of human rights 
commissions in hate speech cases.25 The debate came to the fore when some 
mainstream publications were the subject of complaints to commissions and, 
in the case of Maclean’s magazine, a hearing before the B.C. Human Rights 
Tribunal.26 Some commentators, including Ezra Levant and Mark Steyn 
(who were both subjects of complaints), mounted campaigns that were 
deeply critical of the CHRC and the restriction of freedom of expression by 
human rights tribunals more generally.  
Perhaps as a result of the criticisms, in 2008 the Canadian Human 
Rights Commission asked law professor Richard Moon to report on 
mechanisms to address hate messages, particularly those on the Internet. 
Professor Moon’s report is a thorough discussion on some of the tensions 
inherent in the interpretation of section 13. In particular, he points out 
that while the Tribunal is generally charged with addressing discrimina-
tion and giving a large and liberal interpretation to the CHRA, protection 
of freedom of expression requires a narrow understanding of what consti-
tutes hatred for the purposes of section 13. Professor Moon 
recommended repealing section 13 and included a variety of other rec-
ommendations to address the issue of hateful messages in the event the 
provision was not repealed.27  
The statutory language used by section 13 of the CHRA to describe 
the types of messages prohibited has not changed since Taylor. However, 
that provision was amended in 2001 to make explicit that it applied to 
                                                                                                             
25 For a helpful discussion on why human rights commissions and, in particular, the CHRC, 
have received increased attention in recent years, particularly with respect to hate speech provisions, 
see R. Moon, “The Attack on Human Rights Commissions and the Corruption of Public Discourse” 
(2011) 73 Sask. L.J. 93 [hereinafter “Moon, ‘The Attack’”].  
26 See Elmasry v. Roger’s Publishing, [2008] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 378, 64 C.H.R.R. D/509 
(B.C.H.R.T.). The process in B.C. is different in that, in general, all complaints go directly to the 
tribunal without a human rights commission performing a screening function.  
27 The Moon Report also noted that there was widespread misunderstanding about the 
complaint process under the CHRA. Professor Moon subsequently addressed many of these 
misconceptions in Moon, “The Attack”, supra, note 25.  
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hate messages on the Internet.28 Since this clarification was made, the 
provision has frequently been applied to websites where the predominant 
messages are hateful diatribes against a wide variety of groups protected 
by the Act. The accessibility of the Internet in Canadian society and the 
ability to quickly transmit messages repeatedly via social networks has 
only served to intensify debate about hate speech laws, particularly since 
Canada has no jurisdiction to regulate or attempt to shut down websites 
that are hosted in other countries, but available to Canadian readers.  
In the Fall of 2011, a Private Member’s Bill was introduced propos-
ing section 13’s repeal. Shortly before this paper went to press, the bill 
was passed and received Royal Assent.29 This means that there will no 
longer be a hate speech provision in the CHRA, although its counterparts 
in several provincial jurisdictions (including the Saskatchewan provision 
at issue in Whatcott) do remain in place.  
III. THE WHATCOTT DECISION 
1. Facts and Judicial History 
The Whatcott case was heard in October of 2011 by a seven-judge 
panel of the Court.30 It took the Court until late February of 2013 
(16 months) to render a decision and, by that time, one of the panel 
members, Deschamps J., had retired. As a result, the case represents the 
views of only two-thirds of the Supreme Court bench.31  
The case arose out of four flyers distributed in Regina and Saskatoon 
by Mr. Whatcott on behalf of a group known as the Christian Truth 
                                                                                                             
28 Section 13(2) of the CHRA states: “For greater certainty, subsection (1) applies in respect 
of a matter that is communicated by means of a computer or a group of interconnected or related 
computers, including the Internet, or any similar means of communication, but does not apply in 
respect of a matter that is communicated in whole or in part by means of the facilities of a 
broadcasting undertaking.” 
29 Bill C-304, An Act to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act (Protecting Freedom), 
1st Sess., 41st Parl., 2011 [hereinafter “Bill C-304”]. This Bill received Royal Assent on June 26, 
2013 but does not come into force until June 26, 2014.  
30 At the time that the appeal was heard, Binnie and Charron JJ. had retired, but Moldaver 
and Karakatsanis JJ. were not appointed until a few days after the hearing. 
31 In light of the six-judge panel, it seems likely that a unanimous decision was considered 
important in this case. It is particularly interesting that McLachlin C.J.C., the author of strong 
dissents in both Taylor and Keegstra, neither dissented in Whatcott to reiterate the concerns 
expressed in earlier decisions, nor wrote the decision to explain whether her views had changed or 
she felt bound by precedent.  
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Activists.32 Two of the flyers were identical and consisted of a reprint of 
a page of classified ads with the addition of handwritten comments. The 
other two flyers, entitled “Keep Homosexuality out of Saskatoon’s Public 
Schools!” and “Sodomites in our Public Schools” dealt with the topics of 
homosexuality in public schools, and included biblical references and 
quotes as well as calls for individuals to contact their school authorities 
on the subject of the “corruption” of school children with “sodomite 
propaganda”. Four individuals who had received the flyers at home 
lodged complaints with the Human Rights Commission alleging a 
violation of section 14 of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code 
(“SHRC” or “Saskatchewan Code”) and the matter proceeded before the 
Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal. The Tribunal found a violation of 
the section and held that section 14(1)(b) was a reasonable limitation on 
section 2(b) of the Charter. Mr. Whatcott was ordered to pay 
compensation to the complainants, and he and his group were prohibited 
from distributing the flyers and any similar materials. 
On appeal, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench upheld the 
Tribunal’s decision. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, however, dis-
agreed and concluded that the material distributed by Mr. Whatcott did 
not violate section 14 of the Code. In two separate judgments, members 
of the Court of Appeal found that the moral context of the expression at 
issue needed to be taken account and one judge put significant emphasis 
on the idea that the flyers took issue with sexual conduct and not with 
individuals. While the Court of Appeal did uphold the constitutionality of 
the hate speech provision in the Saskatchewan Code, the Court’s reasons 
show a concern about the breadth of the provision and its potential to 
unduly limit freedom of expression.  
The Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Canada and Mr. Whatcott made a motion to state 
constitutional questions with respect to the constitutionality of 
Saskatchewan’s hate speech provision. Following years of debate and 
discussion about the effectiveness of hate speech provisions at the federal 
level, as well as a Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision that seriously 
questioned how to address religious beliefs that might be expressed in 
offensive or even hateful terms, the stage was set for a thorough look at 
how the hate speech regime was operating. The Court was given an 
opportunity to reconsider the constitutionality of hate speech laws 
                                                                                                             
32 The full text of all four of the flyers is included in an appendix to the Supreme Court’s 
decision.  
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enshrined in human rights statutes in light of over two decades of 
experience.  
2. The Court’s Unanimous Decision 
The unanimous Supreme Court judgment, written by Rothstein J., 
upheld the constitutionality of section 14(1)(b) of the Saskatchewan 
Code.33 The decision recognized that, although the wording of the 
Saskatchewan provision does not precisely mirror the federal provision, 
the Taylor definition of “hatred” has generally been the one applied in 
cases under Saskatchewan’s Code.34 Indeed, the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal had already effectively read out the portion of the Code that 
would allow a finding that ridiculing, belittling or otherwise affronting 
the dignity of a person or class of persons on the basis of a prohibited 
ground constituted a violation.35 The Court rejected the idea that the 
Taylor definition of hatred is necessarily subjective and overly broad. 
According to the Court, Taylor provides a workable definition as long as 
it is interpreted with three key rules in mind: 
(1) There must be an objective component to the proper interpretation 
of hatred, thus making the relevant question whether a reasonable 
person, aware of the context and circumstances of the case, would 
view the expression as exposing the protected group to hatred. 
(2) Only the most extreme forms of expression are caught by the term 
“hatred”. 
(3) The focus in cases under this provision must be on the effect of the 
expression at issue rather than the offensiveness of the content on its 
own.36  
                                                                                                             
33 That section states:  
14(1) No person shall publish or display, or cause or permit to be published or 
displayed, on any lands or premises or in a newspaper, through a television or radio 
broadcasting station or any other broadcasting device, or in any printed matter or publication 
or by means of any other medium that the person owns, controls, distributes or sells, any 
representation, including any notice, sign, symbol, emblem, article, statement or other 
representation … that exposes or tends to expose to hatred, ridicules, belittles or otherwise 
affronts the dignity of any person or class of persons on the basis of a prohibited ground. 
34 Whatcott, supra, note 3, at para. 87. 
35 Owens v. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission), [2006] S.J. No. 221, 279 Sask. R. 
161 (Sask. C.A.) [hereinafter “Owens”]. 
36 Whatcott, supra, note 3, at paras. 56-58. 
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The Court accepted that section 14(1)(b) of the Saskatchewan Code 
violated section 2(b) of the Charter, but concluded that when interpreted 
in this manner, it is a reasonable limit on freedom of expression. As in 
Taylor, the Court’s section 1 analysis accepted that the legislature had a 
pressing and substantial objective in seeking to curb hateful expression, 
but the Court arguably reframed that objective slightly in Whatcott. The 
Taylor majority talked about two types of harms occasioned by hate 
speech: the injury done to the feelings and self-esteem of the discrete 
groups being targeted, and the possibility that hateful messages might 
operate to convince others that those groups are inferior. In Whatcott the 
Court seems to shift away from the former type of harm, focusing much 
more on the harm that hate speech may do to society as a whole. Justice 
Rothstein held that the provision is about more than protecting individu-
als from humiliation and/or hurt feelings. Rather, he held that hate speech 
provisions in human rights statutes “aim to eliminate the most extreme 
type of expression that has the potential to incite or inspire discrimina-
tory treatment against protected groups on the basis of a prohibited 
ground”.37  
The goal of hate speech legislation, according to the Court, is to pre-
vent discriminatory treatment. The judgment goes to great lengths to 
make the point that the focus should be on the likely effects of the ex-
pression rather than “the nature of the ideas expressed”.38 The judgment 
even states explicitly that the section does not protect vulnerable groups 
against expression that debates the merits of reducing their rights, simply 
expression that might expose them to hatred in the context of such a de-
bate. According to Rothstein J., the section “does not target the ideas, but 
their mode of expression in public and the effect that this mode of ex-
pression may have”.39 In addition, the Court states that the assessment of 
whether a particular instance of expression amounts to hatred is a case-
specific inquiry which will depend on context and circumstance. 
As had already been done by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in 
Owens,40 the Supreme Court read out that part of section 14(1)(b) which, 
in its view, did not rise to the level of extreme hatred. The Court deter-
mined that the portion of the provision that refers to expression that 
“ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of” protected groups 
                                                                                                             
37 Id., at para. 48. 
38 Id., at para. 49.  
39 Id., at paras. 51-52.  
40 Supra, note 35. 
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would capture too much. As a result, Rothstein J. held that this part of the 
provision was not rationally connected to the legislature’s goal of ad-
dressing systemic discrimination.  
In terms of assessing whether section 14(1)(b) is a minimal impair-
ment of freedom of expression, the Court acknowledged that there may 
be a variety of ways to achieve the legislature’s goals, but found that the 
one chosen in this case was reasonable. The Court considered several of 
the arguments made by those who argue that the section is overly broad, 
in particular the concern that there is no intent requirement, there is no 
requirement for proof of harm, and the section does not provide for any 
defences (including the defence of truth). It dismissed each of these in 
turn with a rather brief and perfunctory analysis.41  
Since Mr. Whatcott argued that the views he expressed in his flyers 
were rooted in his religious beliefs, the Court also had to consider the 
claim that section 14(1)(b) of the Saskatchewan Code infringes freedom 
of religion. The Court held that a violation of section 2(a) was estab-
lished but that, for reasons substantially similar to those with respect to 
section 2(b), the infringement was justified under section 1.42  
Finally, having found that the section withstood constitutional scru-
tiny, the Court applied it to the facts. The Court concluded that two of 
Mr. Whatcott’s flyers (those relating to homosexuality and the public 
school system) did promote hatred under the section, while two others 
did not. Notwithstanding that the Tribunal and courts below had all effec-
tively applied the same standard in assessing whether there was a 
violation of the Saskatchewan Code, the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
conclusion on the issue was different than the one reached by any of the 
prior decision-makers.  
Conspicuously absent from the decision is a comment by  
McLachlin C.J.C. about her dissent in Taylor and what allowed her to 
sign on to the unanimous judgment in Whatcott, notwithstanding the 
views she had expressed years earlier. It is unclear whether the Chief 
Justice simply decided that she had to follow stare decisis and that there 
was nothing significant to distinguish Taylor from Whatcott, or whether 
her views had simply changed.  
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IV. DISSECTING THE WHATCOTT DECISION 
In many ways the Whatcott case provided the Court with an 
opportunity to carefully and thoughtfully consider its approach to 
freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and equality rights and the 
role that these fundamental rights have in modern Canadian society. It is 
evident that hate speech is far from the most important freedom of 
expression issue in Canada. As discussed earlier, complaints under hate 
speech provisions of human rights codes are not particularly common 
and it is even less common for matters to actually proceed to a hearing 
before a tribunal. The Criminal Code prohibition on hate speech, while 
still on the books, has fallen into disuse. Nevertheless, hate speech laws 
are in many ways a useful litmus test for assessing how freedom of 
expression is protected in our society. The real question before the Court 
in Whatcott was how well the hate speech provision in Saskatchewan’s 
Code “fit” with the objective of trying to reduce or eliminate 
discriminatory treatment.  
Since Taylor, the Court’s approach to freedom of expression has 
evolved in a number of respects, most notably in the realm of the com-
mon law of defamation, which has seen a recalibration of the balance 
between protection of reputation and freedom of expression.43 In Grant 
and Cusson, the Court created a new defence to defamation for responsi-
ble communication on matters of public interest. Whereas the Court in 
these cases demonstrated a willingness to modernize the law of defama-
tion in light of contemporary developments,44 the Court in Whatcott 
retreated to the safety of precedent and avoided a serious reconsideration 
of the hate speech provisions. The Court had the opportunity to consider 
over 20 years of jurisprudence in this area, as well as a comprehensive 
report on Internet hate speech prepared by Professor Moon and academic 
critiques and commentaries addressing many sides of the issue. It also 
had the chance to consider the revolution in communications technology 
that has taken place since Taylor and that has, in many respects, democ-
ratized expression. The Internet creates both increased opportunities for 
the spread of hateful messages along with a concomitant increase in the 
                                                                                                             
43 See, e.g., Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Grant”] and Quan v. Cusson, [2009] S.C.J. No. 62, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Cusson”].  
44 Along similar lines, the Court in Crookes v. Newton, [2011] S.C.J. No. 47, [2011] 
3 S.C.R. 269 (S.C.C.) also took a contemporary approach to considering whether an online hyperlink 
constituted publication for the purposes of the common law of defamation.  
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ability of individuals to respond to and counter such messages. Although 
Whatcott is a case about “old-fashioned” expression (i.e., hard-copy print 
media), it is both surprising and disappointing that the Court chose not to 
seize the opportunity to undertake a thorough examination of so many of 
the important issues to which it gives rise.  
1. Avoiding the Subjectivity Problem 
On the surface, Rothstein J.’s judgment did attempt to recognize and 
address the criticisms of the Taylor definition of “hatred”. He noted that 
the critiques fall into two main categories of subjectivity and over-
breadth. Significantly, these are primarily the same issues raised by 
McLachlin J.’s dissent in Taylor. However, as explored further below, 
while Taylor attempted to address those issues as they existed at the time, 
the discussion by the Court in Whatcott is evasive and unhelpful in 
remedying some of the problems with the application of hate speech pro-
visions that were apparent after nearly a quarter-century of experience.  
Justice Rothstein noted that one common concern about hate speech 
provisions is that hatred is an emotion and is thus necessarily and inher-
ently subjective. On an intuitive level, this is something that we all know 
to be true. Hatred is something we feel in our gut; it is strong and often 
irrational, but it is nothing if not personal. Surely our Supreme Court Jus-
tices know this as well. Nevertheless, we are told in the Whatcott 
judgment that this can be fixed, if only we place our focus on the right 
things, namely the “proper meaning” of the words chosen by the legisla-
ture and by applying the provision in light of its objectives.45  
This suggestion that subjectivity can be avoided or significantly 
mitigated by focusing on these issues ignores the reality that, despite 
applying the objective Taylor standard, tribunals and courts have 
frequently come to opposing conclusions on whether particular 
statements meet the definition of hatred. In many of the cases that have 
been adjudicated by a tribunal but then appealed to another level, there 
has been disagreement about whether the expression being challenged 
ran afoul of the legislation.46  
                                                                                                             
45 Whatcott, supra, note 3, at para. 38.  
46 See, e.g., Lund v. Boissoin, 2007 AHRC 11, affd [2009] A.J. No. 1345, 17 Alta. L.R. 
(5th) 256 (Alta. Q.B.), affd [2012] A.J. No. 1036, 69 Alta. L.R. (5th) 272 (Alta. C.A.), where a 
Human Rights Panel of Alberta found that an op-ed published in a newspaper violated Alberta’s hate 
speech provision. On appeal, the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta and Alberta Court of Appeal 
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Indeed, in Whatcott itself the Tribunal that first heard the complaint 
found that all of the flyers Mr. Whatcott distributed violated 
section 14(1)(b). The Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench agreed, but 
the Court of Appeal disagreed and held that none of the flyers breached 
the Act. Finally, the Supreme Court of Canada found that two flyers 
violated the law, while two others did not. Each of these decision-makers 
applied the same “objective” definition of hatred in arriving at a decision, 
yet each came to different conclusions. This kind of back and forth is 
expected and even welcome in certain areas of the law as courts seek to 
give precision to open-ended terms and statutory language. In freedom of 
expression cases, however, this kind of uncertainty is deeply troubling. 
Combined with the failure to account for over 20 years of new 
developments, it raises a realistic concern that there will be a chilling 
effect on some expression that was not intended to be caught by the 
legislation. It is one thing to place restrictions on what can and cannot be 
said when the subjects of these restrictions understand the limits. It is 
quite another to risk discouraging political and social debates by 
invoking a standard that even great legal minds are unable to consistently 
decipher.  
Thus, the Court largely ignored the prior experience with the 
application of the Taylor definition and the uncertainty that it can breed 
when it urged us to consider the “proper meaning of the words chosen by 
the legislature”. The Taylor definition of hatred as “unusually strong and 
deep-felt emotions of detestation, calumny and vilification” certainly 
makes plain that hate speech is extreme, but it does so by replacing 
“hatred” with other equally subjective terms, at least one of which — 
detestation — is simply a synonym for hatred. Synonyms can sometimes 
be helpful in distilling the true essence of a term, but the synonyms from 
Taylor, used over and over again in hate speech jurisprudence, obviously 
did not have a particularly clarifying effect. The Court in Whatcott did 
not provide any assistance or guidance in this regard, and in a 
particularly unhelpful portion of the judgment determined that the term 
“calumny” was no longer helpful in light of its “general disuse”. In fact, 
the Court’s explanation of why this term should be removed may actually 
further muddy the waters by suggesting that the emotions represented by 
                                                                                                             
disagreed and found no violation. Similarly, in Owens v. Saskatchewan (Human Rights 
Commission), supra, note 35, a Board of Inquiry found a violation of the Saskatchewan Code and 
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the term “calumny” are neither necessary nor sufficient to find 
expression hateful.47  
The Court also ignored some of the experience since Taylor when it 
failed to consider the chilling impact that might be occasioned even if 
human rights tribunals interpret hate speech provisions appropriately. 
This was one of the concerns highlighted by the Moon Report and it 
relates to the investigation process undertaken by human rights 
commissions as they decide which complaints will ultimately be referred 
to a tribunal. Individuals may be the subject of complaints to the 
Commission for expression that is controversial, but does not rise to the 
level of hate speech under Taylor. While they are being investigated, they 
may very well hesitate to speak out on issues of importance to them for 
fear of further complaints. A similar impact may be felt on others with 
similar views. Although the Court did not acknowledge it, inconsistent 
court and tribunal decisions, combined with the vague definition of 
hatred, creates a chill that threatens our constitutionally protected 
freedom of expression. 
2. Evading the Harm Problem 
Justice Rothstein suggested that we can also help mitigate the 
subjectivity of “hatred” if we apply the provision in light of its legislative 
objectives. Hate speech is said to be problematic because of the harm 
that it causes, not only to those whom it targets, but to society as a whole. 
As mentioned above, the Court in Whatcott placed particular emphasis 
on the societal harm that hate speech may cause and significantly less 
emphasis on the more personal effects on those whom it targets. In my 
view, however, the decision contains two fundamental flaws in the 
manner in which it addresses the question of harm. First, the approach to 
evidence of harm is sloppy. This is unfortunate because of the precedent 
it sets for future cases. Second, the Court fails to grapple with the true 
nature of the harm that is of concern to the legislature (and the Court) 
and address whether and how the hate speech provision at issue in 
Whatcott actually responds to this type of harm. 
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(a) The Evidence of Harm 
The first concern about the evidentiary standard is not specific to 
Whatcott or even to hate speech cases generally. Rather, the concern that 
there is little concrete evidence of the harm that expression actually 
causes arises in many freedom of expression cases.48 There is conflicting 
social science evidence on the issue of whether or how hate speech con-
tributes to discrimination, pornography to patriarchy and violence against 
women, and depictions of violence to a more violent society. It is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to isolate expression as the sole or even a major 
contributing cause of some of society’s biggest problems. Notwithstand-
ing the conflicting evidence, few people would take issue with the notion 
that hate speech does do at least some harm to at least some people. It is 
hard to read material that compares your ethnic group to vermin or de-
scribes you as “sub-human” without being hurt. One need not be the 
target of the hateful expression to feel truly offended, disturbed and dis-
gusted by these kinds of messages.  
The discussion of harm in Whatcott does recognize, at least to a cer-
tain extent, that the Court is not really requiring evidence of any harm at 
all in many cases where freedom of expression is implicated. Justice 
Rothstein points out that the “reasonable apprehension of harm” standard 
has been used in a variety of freedom of expression contexts where the 
nature of the expression at issue is said to result in harm but where a 
causal link cannot truly be proven. The Court is aware of the many cri-
tiques of this approach and does attempt to respond. For the Court, 
however, requiring a clear causal link between expression and harm  
“ignores the particularly insidious nature of hate speech. The end goal of 
hate speech is to shift the environment from one where harm against vul-
nerable people is not tolerated to one where hate speech has created a 
place where this is either accepted or a blind eye is turned.”49  
With respect to the Court, this explanation is inadequate. The Court’s 
strong emphasis on the effects of hate speech is paradoxically paired with 
a brief and shoddy approach to the evidence of those effects. Indeed, the 
Court’s reliance on evidence to support the notion that hateful messages 
translate into discriminatory actions is summed up briefly as follows: 
“As was clear from Taylor, and reaffirmed through the evidence 
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submitted by interveners in this appeal, the discriminatory effects of hate 
speech are part of the everyday knowledge and experience of 
Canadians.”50 There is no discussion of what this evidence was — 
whether it involved testimonies from individuals, expert reports, social 
science research. If the Court is taking judicial notice of harm, this 
should be made explicit. If there is evidence that goes to establishing a 
reasonable apprehension of harm, it should be outlined and referenced. In 
fact, the Court refers to the “evidence submitted by interveners” even 
though interveners are not permitted to adduce evidence. Perhaps this 
refers to secondary sources cited in argument, but this is not made plain. 
Even if we are willing to accept a lower evidentiary standard in hate 
speech cases, the Court’s laissez-faire approach to the evidence in 
Whatcott sets a troubling precedent for all cases where the Court has 
supported a more deferential approach to legislatures.  
(b) The Type of Harm 
The second flaw in the Court’s approach to harm is that the decision 
fails to really address the nature of the harm targeted by the legislation 
and engage with whether or not it is truly responsive to this type of harm. 
In my view, the hateful and disturbing expression caught by the Taylor 
standard appeals to a particular, and narrow, audience. It is so extreme 
that those most susceptible to it are those who already share the views 
being expressed. The type of expression that is much more likely to 
“shift the environment” in the manner envisioned by Rothstein J. is much 
tamer than the kind of expression that contains many of the “hallmarks of 
hatred”. There is a strong argument that the shifting of attitudes is more 
likely to be effected by subtle expressions of disapproval or concern 
about a group than by explicit, hateful diatribes directed at them. Con-
trary to the Court’s assertions that expression that “ridicules and 
belittles” a group is not rationally connected to the legislature’s goals, it 
is the cartoon that pokes fun at cultural stereotypes or the op-ed on the 
“dangers” of immigration from developing countries that may have the 
most significant impact on stereotyping and discrimination in everyday 
life. As the majority recognized in Taylor, “systemic discrimination is 
much more widespread in our society than is intentional discrimination”.51 
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The more subtle forms of discriminatory speech are the analogue to sys-
temic discrimination. True hate speech, like intentional discrimination, is 
much less widespread and may be ultimately less subversive in its ef-
fects.  
Professor Moon’s Report argues that protecting vulnerable individu-
als from discrimination requires a liberal interpretive approach to human 
rights provisions so that substantive equality can be achieved and so that 
systemic discrimination can be tackled. At the same time, robust protec-
tion for freedom of expression mandates a narrow definition of “hatred” 
so that only the most extreme forms of expression are caught by the pro-
vision. Some might contend that this simply means the provisions do not 
go far enough, and that we should either try to capture all of it or at least 
settle for capturing the worst of it to help mitigate or avoid some of the 
harms caused by this type of expression. My contention is different. 
I suggest that the messages that are excluded from the strict interpreta-
tion of hate speech provisions are far more likely to impinge upon the 
rights of vulnerable groups than what is included. This contradiction is 
highlighted when the Court explains that it is not the offensive ideas that 
the provision prohibits, simply the mode of expression and the effect that 
it may have.52 
The Court’s failure to examine this issue in detail is troubling in light 
of its repeated reminders that it is not the content of the expression that 
the provision is concerned with, but primarily its effect. One of the ra-
tionales underlying the Court’s decision is the notion that hate speech 
seeks to “silence” those it targets and therefore undermines the purposes 
of freedom of expression. This argument is stated in conclusory terms 
and is not, in my view, convincing.53 The most extreme forms of speech 
caught by the Court’s interpretation — and containing the hallmarks of 
hatred — are not the kinds of speech most individuals generally take se-
riously. The idea that minority groups are regularly forced to argue for 
their own basic humanity gives far too much credit to those who espouse 
hatred and insufficient credit to those who abhor it and who regularly 
seek to promote equality and curb discrimination. It also devalues the 
role of counter-speech as a powerful weapon against hate speech and 
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ignores the reality that it is not only targeted minorities who speak out for 
their rights; many others also speak out in support.54  
3. A Missed Opportunity to Reconcile Rights 
A final problem with the Court’s unanimous decision in Whatcott is 
that it fails to attempt to reconcile the competing rights at issue in the 
case. The Court finds that hate speech “is at some distance from the spirit 
of s. 2(b) because it does little to promote, and can in fact impede, the 
values underlying freedom of expression”.55 As a result of this lowered 
status, there is hardly a need to reconcile freedom of expression with the 
right to equality and the rigorous standards that should be applied to con-
stitutional violations are eroded. The finding that the value of the speech 
is a relevant factor in assessing claims of rights violations also sends us 
down a dangerous path. In particular, while the Court has always af-
firmed a broad ambit for the expression that is protected by section 2(b) 
and left justifications to section 1, the lack of rigour in the Court’s justifi-
cation analysis in Whatcott suggests that this is not how things are 
operating in practice. Given the reality that prohibiting hate speech ar-
guably has a very minimal impact on improving the rights of minority 
groups and/or eradicating discrimination, this approach is disappointing.  
V. MOVING FORWARD: THE NEXT 20 YEARS AND  
SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES 
I have argued that the Supreme Court in Whatcott missed an impor-
tant opportunity to reconcile competing rights, address the critiques of 
the Taylor standard, and consider the experience with over 20 years of 
human rights adjudication on the question of hate speech. In my view, 
the Court did not do the hard work required to really address the subjec-
tivity problem that has plagued those deciding hate speech cases since 
Taylor. The Court also put significant emphasis on the harmful effects of 
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hate speech but then avoided the question of the evidentiary standard 
required to establish harm and evaded a thorough exploration of the type 
of harm being addressed. It is not easy to adequately reconcile the com-
peting interests of freedom of expression, freedom of religion and 
equality, so the Court evaded the issue by labelling hate speech a form of 
expression that is less valuable and thus less worthy of protection. Taking 
this easy way out deprived us of a thoughtful discussion on how to ap-
proach the problem of hate speech and the goal of achieving equality. It 
also sidestepped the difficult questions surrounding how to address situa-
tions when sincerely held religious beliefs may be the source of 
discriminatory expression and/or treatment directed at certain groups.  
It remains to be seen what the next 20 years has in store for hate 
speech laws. While the Whatcott decision was rendered in 2013, the fly-
ers at the centre of the case were circulated in 2001 and 2002. Today, 
hate messages can be spread around the world via micro-blogging sites 
and social networks. Mr. Whatcott himself is now on Twitter and, not-
withstanding the Supreme Court’s judgment, he continues to spread his 
messages, perhaps to an even wider audience. The Court’s decision is 
certainly not the last word on hate speech, but it may be the last judicial 
word for at least a few years. Those who share the view that hate speech 
laws are bad policy may need to look for other means of eliminating 
them. As mentioned above, in September 2011, a Private Member’s Bill 
repealing the CHRA’s hate speech provision was proposed in the House 
of Commons.56 Despite debate and strong expressions of concern from a 
number of Members of Parliament and Senators, the bill ultimately 
passed. In my view, repealing section 13, and other provisions like it, is 
good public policy. Although intended to protect vulnerable minorities, 
cases under hate speech provisions use up the valuable and scarce re-
sources of human rights commissions and tribunals which should be used 
to directly combat discrimination and engage in counter-speech when 
hateful messages are spread around. Further, pursuing a hate speech 
complaint before a tribunal and subsequent reviewing courts has a per-
verse effect on the spread of hateful messages. While Mr. Whatcott 
began with distributing flyers in Saskatoon and Regina, he received na-
tional attention not only for his case but also for the messages that lay at 
its core. His flyers are appended to a Supreme Court of Canada judgment 
and thus readily available for everyone to read.  
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Pursuing Mr. Whatcott under Saskatchewan’s Code made him a mar-
tyr for freedom of expression and his loss at the Supreme Court only 
further emboldened him. This is not good for freedom of expression and 
it is not good for equality. The Supreme Court missed an opportunity to 
address this issue, but there will be other opportunities that will, hope-
fully, be seized. The real concern arising out of Whatcott is the impact 
that its analysis may have in other freedom of expression cases.  
The conflict between freedom of expression and the fight for equal-
ity is likely to continue, if not intensify, and the Court must give due 
consideration to how these constitutionally protected rights can be recon-
ciled and promoted. A number of cases have come up in recent years 
where Canadian courts are asked to protect religious freedom at the ex-
pense of the equality rights of the LGBTQ community. In other cases the 
courts are asked to stop discrimination in a manner that arguably in-
fringes freedom of religion. Although these cases are often about more 
than religious expression, the analysis in Whatcott may prove to be per-
suasive in these cases as well. The Court’s harm analysis — or its failure 
to truly analyze the question of harm — is part of a disturbing trend. 
Moreover, the outcome in Whatcott and the upholding of the hate speech 
provision in the Saskatchewan Code should not make us complacent 
about the protection of minorities and the goal of achieving substantive 
equality for disadvantaged groups. Even if we accept the Court’s conclu-
sion that these laws do help weed out discrimination, there is much work 
to be done. Those who advocate for freedom of expression also have a 
responsibility to speak out against hateful expression and counter it. This 
approach, which requires direct action by individuals and allows for 
flexibility to address a variety of modes of communication, may ulti-
mately prove more effective than any piece of legislation in silencing or, 
at least, isolating, those who preach hate. 
  
 
